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gastrointestinal side effects seen with the use of non-
selective traditional NSAIDS.
This one-sided emphasis on lack of gastrointestinal
toxicity, while largely ignoring other adverse events,
was, in fact, the motto behind the marketing of the first
selective COX-2 inhibitor, celecoxib, better known as
Celebrex (Pfizer, NY, NY, USA). Its promotion was
based on a trial named CLASS [2] (Celecoxib Long-
term Arthritis Safety Study), focusing on its safety
profile, yet at the same time underscoring the fact that it
was at best a very weak COX-2 inhibitor and at worst no
better than the traditional, but much cheaper NSAIDS
[3].c At the same time, another agent, rofecoxib (Vioxx)
a more robust molecule, was trialed. Its superior COX-
2 selectivity, combined with its excellent gastrointestinal
safety profile, as shown in the VIGOR (Vioxx Gas-
trointestinal Outcomes Research) study, were ex-
tremely encouraging [4].
So, with these data in 1999, and well before the pub-
lication of the VIGOR study results in the New England
Journal of Medicine in November 2000, Vioxx was ap-
proved for widespread use by the United States Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), allowing an aggres-
sive and successful marketing campaign.d Unfortu-
nately, this is where the story goes sour. What was
curiously ignored in the report of the VIGOR study was
the fact that Vioxx carried a five-times(!) higher risk for
myocardial infarction, which was explained by the
authors at the time to be due to a potential cardiopro-
tective effect of the comparator drug used in the study;
namely, naproxen [5]. This farfetched pleonasm, which
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The story of Vioxx (rofecoxib; Merck Sharpe &
Dohme, Whitehouse, NJ, USA)
The history of the development of nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDS) is a combination of
great pride and great shame. Great pride in the applica-
tion of bench pharmacology (the discovery of selective
cyclooxygenase 2 [COX-2] inhibitors) into clinical prac-
tice and great pride in the stunning commercial success
of these “blockbuster drugs”,a but great shame with the
abrupt withdrawal of a drug considered to be the “holy
grail” for pain relief.b How could this have happened,
or, more importantly, what are the lessons we can learn
from the story of Vioxx?
For over 40 years, starting with aspirin, NSAIDS have
been used for pain relief in inflammatory diseases. As
new molecules appeared on the market the indications
for their use broadened to almost any painful (inflam-
matory or not) condition. But, just like steroids, their
use was limited by toxicity, notably gastrointestinal
bleeding and renal insufficiency [1]. It was the discovery
of two isoforms of COX (COX-1 and COX-2) in the
early 1990s that ignited interest in developing the class
of COX-2 inhibitors, of which Vioxx is a member. The
plausible mechanism of action offered was that selective
COX-2 inhibition results in pain relief, while sparing the
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a Worldwide annual sales of NSAIDS are estimated to be
around 20 billion US dollars
b See: Merck announces voluntary worldwide withdrawal of
Vioxx. News release. Whitehouse Station, NJ: Merck 2004.
www.vioxx.com/vioxx/documents/english/vioxx_press_
release.pdf
c The editor of JAMA at the time, when he found out that
Celebrex was not as good as presented, was interviewed in the
Washington Post saying: “. . . I am furious . . . I look like a
fool . . . we are functioning on a level of trust and that was
perhaps, broken . . .”. Susan Oakie, Washington Post, August
5, 2001, A11
d In those 18 months, Merck Sharpe & Dohme and Pfizer
grossed more than 3 billion US dollars
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was not based on any clinical or theoretical evidence
whatsoever, apparently satisfied the FDA at the time,
but was quickly rebutted by many authors once the
VIGOR study results where published.e Despite all this,
it was only in April 2002 (or around 4 billion US dollars
later), that the manufacturers were instructed by the
FDA to include certain precautions about the cardio-
vascular risks of Vioxx in its package insert [6]. Why
such delay occurred remains unclear.
Despite the attempts of the manufacturers to recon-
firm the favorable cardiovascular safety of Vioxx with
“education” symposiums and “expert panels”, the
metaanalysis of data showed unequivocally that Vioxx
carried a significantly increased risk for myocardial inf-
arction, thrombo-embolic events, hypertension, and
heart failure. Probably the study that finally tipped the
balance and compelled Merck to withdraw Vioxx was
the APPROVe (Adenomatous Polyp Prevention On
Vioxx) study [7]. This unpublished trial, which was
planned to show the virtues of selective COX-2 inhibi-
tion on tumor transformation of polyps (COX-2 is
thought to play a role in carcinogenesis), proved again
the only previously known fact—that with Vioxx you
have a higher risk of having a heart attack [8].
How could this have happened?
Unfortunately, Vioxx is not the first drug to be with-
drawn from the market, nor is Merck the first drug
company to have to do so. Knowledge evolves and
theory might be proved to be false; thus, the fact that
what was thought to be a beneficial effect of COX-2
inhibition (less gastrointestinal bleeding) turned out to
be an adverse effect (more cardiovascular events)f is not
troubling as such. What makes the Vioxx story disturb-
ing is the fact that none of the three major forces in this
51/2-year affair—the FDA, the National Institute of
Health (NIH) and Merck—fulfilled their responsibility
to the public. How could this have happened?
In order to answer this question it is important to
analyze the roots of the omnipresence and omnipotence
of the pharmaceutical industry in our modern lives, an
industry that has tripled its size between 1980 and 2000
and has been consistently ranked as one of the top three
most profitable industries in the world with an esti-
mated gross domestic product of 200 billion US dollars.g
In the United States, one of the landmarks in this devel-
opment is the Bayh-Dole Act (also known as the Tech-
nology Transfer Act, 1980), which enabled publicly
funded research (mostly sponsored by the NIH) to gen-
erate patentable inventions. This law was originally
intended to serve as a financial incentive for universities
and other academic research centers to manage their
intellectual property wisely. Yet, in fact, it created a
perverse system, where publicly funded research was
sold with monopoly rights to private hands, preventing
the diffusion of cheaper generic drugs. So here was a
system where, for example, a drug called Expensodyne
is developed with research paid for by tax money; it is
sold to a private company, called Greedy Inc.; patented
for a period of at least 10 years in order to avoid selling
the generic form Cheapodyne; and during all this time it
is sold to patients at exorbitant prices.
But, alas, the plot thickens. All are convinced that
Expensodyne is needed because it is better, and the
reason it is expensive is to ensure the continuing rese-
arch and development of future new and improved
drugs, such as Expensodyne plus and Expensodyne
forte. Unfortunately, neither of these myths is true.
Drugs are seldom tested against other drugs, but, rather,
against placebo, thus only testing their relative and not
true efficacy. Furthermore, since 1998, more than three-
quarters of the 415 new drugs approved by the FDA
were only minor modifications of older molecules,
referred to as “me-too” drugs. So Expensodyne,
thought to be better than the old cheaper drug, is com-
pared to a sugar pill, and is then sold at high prices in
order to allow Greedy Inc. to develop a more expensive
Expensodyne plus “me-too” version, and so forth.h
For this unfortunate practice to sustain itself, three
major conditions must be satisfied. First, “me-too” drugs
must accommodate very common lifelong chronic con-
ditions. Second, the market is interested in developing
drugs for paying customers (so the poor, the sick, and
the dying are naturally excluded). Third, the market
needs not only to be large but also “elastic”, so that new
indications for the drug’s use can be found, in order to
add a continuing influx of patients. What does this sound
like? Exactly—Vioxx, the perfect match. An anti-
inflammatory drug for a chronic condition (arthritis),
meant for paying customers, which can easily be used for
all (not only inflammatory) types of pain.
Nonetheless, this sort of exploitation was not sup-
posed to happen. The NIH should have required that
e Konstam MA (2001) Circulation; 104:2280–2288; Ray WA
(2002) Lancet; 359:118–123; Diepe PA (2004) BMJ 329:867–
868, to name a few
f The plausible mechanism which emerges is that selective
COX-2 inhibitors suppress platelet vasodilator prostaglandin
prostacyclin (PGI2), without concomitant inhibition of plate-
let vasoconstrictor prostaglandin thromboxane (TxA2), thus
exposing predisposed individuals to a greater risk of myocar-
dial infarction. For further reference, see Fitzgerald GA
(2003) Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 2:879–890
g For a detailed discussion, readers are referred to the excel-
lent book of Marcia Angell (2004) The truth about drug com-
panies: How they deceive us and what to do about it? Random
House, New York, NY
h Idem pp 74–93
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public research be left in the public domain, and should
have demanded that royalties be returned to them and
not exclusively left to private hands. The FDA could
have issued compulsory licensure if drugs were not
made “available to the public on reasonable terms”
(as specifically required by the Bayh-Dole Act).i Unfor-
tunately, none of this has been done, causing a malig-
nant ripple effect, where drugs are overpriced, doctors
receive 11 billion US dollars worth of “free samples”
and are lured into anti-competitive practice, illegally
promoting drugs for unapproved uses and engaging
in direct-to-consumer advertising, colluding with
generic companies to keep cheaper alternatives off the
market.j
What lessons can we learn?
The Vioxx story reflects poorly on the process that leads
to drug approval. In this chronicle there is a combina-
tion of aggressive marketing and complacency of drug
regulators. The FDA retained a passive position, wait-
ing for more harmful data to accrue despite signals that
something was wrong, while allowing Merck to continue
vigorously selling their product. The result: not
only were patients exposed to a bad outcome but they
were also left confused, asking which drugs should we
trust?
It is, in fact, the question of trust, mistrust, informa-
tion, and misinformation which is the central theme of
the ethical analysis of this affair. Thus, it is of interest to
attempt to delineate any difference of individual moral
agency in the medical versus the business milieu. In
general, ethical conduct in modern medicine has been
heavily influenced by deontological ethics (ethics of
duty); namely, those of Immanuel Kant. He stated that
the self is autonomous only when it imposes upon itself
personal rules of conduct that are logically compatible
with universal principles of reason (categorical impera-
tives); therefore, treating others as ultimate recipients
of moral agency and not as simple means to self-
interested ends.k In other words, moral conduct (adher-
ing to categorical imperatives) renders the individual
free (autonomous), and this freedom (autonomy) in
exchange allows the individual to continue to behave
“morally”. Thus, moral principles and daily practice
(praxis) are intimately linked and shape the imminent
moral behavior (for example; by refusing to lie and to
instrumentalize patientsl).
On the other hand, in the “ethics of business”, the
modern capitalistic corporate world bases its moral or-
der on individual liberty by demanding minimal public
interference (“the self-made man”), without a categori-
cal need to adhere to moral imperatives. Thus, although
fraud and extortion are normatively unacceptable, and
equal individuals are expected to negotiate while res-
pecting promises and contracts, these moral principles
remain minimal and negative.m In other words, indi-
vidual freedom (liberty) may or may not depend on
moral conduct; hence, moral principles and daily prac-
tice may be divorced from each other, accepting intoler-
able conduct (e.g., using misinformation as a strategic
tool). This is, of course, in marked distinction from strict
medical codes, which are maximal and positive (e.g.,
duty of care, ideal of life) and practiced in the spirit of
virtuous ethics. This practice, Aristotelian by nature,
strives for professional excellence rather than a moral
minimum of “not getting in trouble”. Thus, the excel-
lent practice of medicine (professionalism) is intimately
linked to the moral excellence (virtue) of the physician
practicing it.n
Thus, inherent differences in the interpretation of
moral demands to the free individual exist between the
medical and the corporate worlds. Individual moral
agents in medicine are obliged to adhere to deontol-
ogical values in daily practice in order to maintain au-
tonomy, while individuals in the corporate world may
not always require this in order to protect their liberty.
So if, indeed, big corporations are unlike medical insti-
tutions and businesspeople are unlike doctors, it is not
surprising that they do not speak the same ethical lan-
guage and may not understand the relevance of incor-
porating moral criteria (such as respect of autonomy,
non-maleficence, beneficence, or justice) into day-to-
day operation. This “real-world” mentality (versus the
“unreal” ideal Kantian or Aristotelian one) with the
sole imperative of profit (which is definitely not one of
Kant’s categorical imperatives), may quickly slip into a
mentality of “moral immunity”, where everything is per-
mitted in the name of financial gain. Thus, although
both bioethics and business ethics are new kindred
vogues of applied ethics, how can one overcome this gap
and merge bioethics with corporate interests?o
In our modern biotechnological world, it is possible
and absolutely necessary to negotiate tensions between
i Idem pp 68–69
j Idem pp 115–118. It is also noteworthy that the Hatch-
Waxman Act, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Res-
toration Act, 1984, actually provided up to 5 years additional
patent life for brand-named drugs, although originally it was
meant to improve market conditions for generic drugs
k L’éthique de Kant. In: Métayer Michel (2002) La philosophie
éthique, 2nd edition, Editions du Ranouveau Pédagogique,
Quebec, pp 52–75
l It is from this maxim that other ideas, such as respect of
autonomy, responsibility, and informed consent have defined
the very nature of modern medical practice
m Idem, L’éthique des affaires: pp 228–255
n See, for detail, Pellegrino ED (2002) Mount Sinai J Med
69:378–384
o For a more elaborate discussion of this topic, see Rahul K.
Dahanda (2002) Guiding Icarus. Wiley-Liss, NY
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these two worlds, and to avoid the repetition of stories
like that of Vioxx.p This, however, entails solutions on
three separate levels: epistemological, legal, and ethical.
In terms of knowledge and correct methodology, the
measures to ensure drug safety before definite licensing
are relatively straightforward. Drug companies need to
register all randomized controlled trials prospectively
and allow all data on serious adverse events to be pub-
licly accessible. This, in turn, will allow the independent
and timely update of systematic reviews of these ad-
verse events. Another possibility is to create an inde-
pendent institute which oversees the clinical testing of
drugs within the NIH, thus ensuring that clinical trials
serve a genuine medical need and do not reinforce indi-
rect marketing (i.e., phase IV studies).
By contrast, limiting pharmaceutical omnipotence by
legislation is much trickier. Exclusive marketing rights
are undesirably long and drug companies have too
much control over clinical research, as well as medical
education, for their products, thereby sustaining a situ-
ation of developing more expensive “me-too” drugs
solely for commercial gain. One possibility is to
strengthen the FDA as an independent agency by
appealing against the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(1997), which authorizes drug companies to pay a
“user’s fee” to the FDA for every drug reviewed,
thereby creating a clear financial firewall between the
FDA and the industry.q
Finally, what can be done from an ethical point of
view? First, it is necessary to recognize that powerful
financial incentives can induce tautological circular rea-
soning (my mind is made up—don’t confuse me with
facts . . .),r using medical research and consequent pub-
lications to obfuscate rather than provide guidance. Sec-
ond, it might be of interest that, in cases of conflicting
medical data (as with Vioxx), each practitioner tries to
apply a “research ethics committee” approach to their
daily practice [9]. This “good clinical practice” may
seem burdensome when applied to every medical act;
however, informing patients about potential adverse
side effects (which need not be exhaustive) does fall
within the scope of duty of care. In the case of Vioxx,
there is no doubt that mentioning the increased risk for
myocardial infarction would have curbed the unre-
stricted use of this “me-too” blockbuster drug. This ap-
proach does not require a resolution of the medical
controversy, but rather, an open and direct approach to
patients. Thus the prudent doctor prescribing Vioxx
would have added a simple statement: “. . . and in the
VIGOR study we found that Vioxx was associated with
a five-times increased incidence of heart attack when
compared to another anti-inflammatory, naproxen . . .”
In summary, the bottom line of the Vioxx story is that
misleading information about the efficacy and safety of
a new medicine can cause confusion at all levels of the
therapeutic chain and can have serious effects on public
health. Attempts to bias clinically relevant information
from health professionals, thought to be needed to pro-
tect patients from injury, and to protect health services
from unnecessary waste, are contrary to public interest
and, in the long run, are counterproductive. Corporate
involvement per se need not compromise moral integ-
rity; however, bioethical reflections must be taken into
account.
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